Russia, Vladimir Putin, Ivan Ilyin, and the Bitter Fruits of History
✍️ Author’s Note
This post explores the ideological influences behind Putin’s worldview, particularly the nationalist thought of Ivan Ilyin. It examines how history, myth, and resentment shape Russian policy—and the modern echoes of past trauma.
When President Boris Yeltsin retired in 1999, with the assistance of his deputy chief of staff Vladislav Surkov—also known as the Puppet Master or the Grey Cardinal, a brilliant public relations expert—he orchestrated the appointment of his own successor. Yeltsin handed supreme power to Vladimir Putin, a former KGB colonel turned politician, safeguarding the interests of the Yeltsin family in the process.
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, born in Leningrad in 1952, experienced the hardships of war within his own family. His father was severely wounded at the front, and his older brother died during childhood, a casualty of the siege. After attending Leningrad State University, Putin joined the KGB, specializing in political intelligence. During the Cold War, he was assigned to a relatively insignificant field office in Dresden, East Germany, where he witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Upon his return after German reunification, Putin became Deputy Rector of Leningrad University and worked for Anatoly Sobchak, his former professor. He served as Chief of Staff before being appointed Deputy Mayor, all while rising through the ranks of the FSB, formerly the KGB. In 1998, known as Vologda in Saint Petersburg’s foreign investment circles, Putin became Deputy to Pavel Borodin, overseeing the Kremlin’s foreign transactions and state holdings. Yeltsin later appointed him Head of the FSB and Secretary of the Security Council in 1999.
Putin’s ascent to power was facilitated by the Yeltsin inner circle, even though he wasn’t the preferred choice of the siloviki, the men of force in charge of the military and state security. They had favoured Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov. However, when it became apparent that Primakov would not grant immunity to Yeltsin and his family, Putin, known for his loyalty, was chosen.
As part of the arrangement with the Yeltsin clan, Putin guaranteed non-prosecution and non-confiscation of Yeltsin’s assets. On August 9th, 1999, Yeltsin replaced Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin with Vladimir Putin, making him his successor. Yeltsin resigned at the end of 1999, and Putin became the acting President until the 2000 elections, during which he pardoned Yeltsin and his family from any criminal charges.
Putin began his presidency with a low approval rating of 2%. His election platform for the “United Russia” party was vague, featuring national figures from Russian history on billboards with the slogan “A strong Russia, Is a United Russia.” Putin’s approach involved welcoming foreign investment while emphasizing the need for a strong nationalist state rooted in traditional Russian values—patriotism, collectivism, and submission to the state. He rejected Western liberal democracy, forming a coalition of centre-right, nationalist, and communist elements.
The sentiments about Russian values expressed by Putin have historical roots, dating back to the mid-eighteenth century after Peter the Great’s “Godless reign.” This period saw the emergence of a new national consciousness, marked by anti-Western ideology defending Russian customs and morals against perceived corrupting influences from the West.
In Russia, the term used to define democracy is “sovereign democracy,” coined by Vladislav Surkov. This concept advocates for Russia’s freedom to choose its political system without foreign interference, essentially endorsing a managed and staged democracy.
On a personal level, it’s reasonable to conclude that Vladimir Putin perceives politeness and friendship as signs of weakness, and he tends to dismantle anything beyond his control. Democracy was never Putin’s closest ally, particularly influenced by the turmoil following the Soviet Union’s collapse. In his initial term, he sought to align Russia more closely with the West, envisioning it as part of Western European culture and expressing openness to Russia joining NATO.
There’s validity in the argument that Europe missed an opportunity to include Russia in a new security arrangement, instead opting to isolate it through NATO, leading to humiliation, reinforced resentment, and a sense of underappreciation by the West. Russia, in turn, distanced itself from the West, partly influenced by President George W. Bush’s self-serving approach to international law. Nationalism, long dormant in Ukraine and Russia, resurfaced, fuelled in part by sanctions. Today, the conflict in Ukraine is Russia’s contribution to 21st-century nation-building.
In Putin’s perspective, the state serves as the guarantor of order and the primary force driving change. His overarching goal has consistently been to restore Russia as a major global power. He believes uncontrolled democracy leads to chaos and weakens the state—a mindset shaped by the lessons learned during his political journey.
The turning point occurred in September 1999 when bombings rocked various cities, killing hundreds. Putin initiated a war against the Chechen republic, holding them responsible despite rumours of FSB involvement. His ruthless tactics and media dominance allowed him to label critics as “enemies of the state,” boosting his popularity to 45% by year-end. These events justified Putin’s consolidation of state power, a trend that continued throughout his tenure.
In Vladimir Putin view the state as guarantor of order and the main driving force of any change. His aim has always been to restore Russia as a major power in the world. These lessons learned have guided him and in his view a uncontrolled democracy only ends in chaos and weakens the state.
This all changed when in September of 1999 bombs started to exploit in different cities killing hundreds of people and Putin ordered his war against the Chechen republic deemed responsible, although FSB involvement was rumoured. Due to his ruthless approach and domination of the media Putin’s he was able to portray his critics as “enemies of the state” as his popularity rose to 45% by the end of the year. The events were also used to justify Putin’s strengthening of state power, which has steadily increased during his years in power.
In the March 2000 election, Putin secured victory with 53% of the vote, aided by government control of television stations and a relentless approach to the Chechen terrorist threat, resulting in the complete destruction of Grozny. Putin’s tactical, cynical, and cold-eyed approach has positioned him strategically throughout his life.
To understand Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, one must delve into his background as a Chekist, considering his experiences before and after the unification of Germany and the Soviet Empire’s disintegration, which he deemed the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”
The notion of Russia’s humiliation by the US and Europe may be spurious, but not as spurious as to conclude “The Present Ukraine Conflict Has Been Thirty Years In The Making.” Historical patterns reveal that during periods of Russian domestic instability, Europe has made territorial gains at Russia’s expense, such as in 1584 during the times of troubles; 1918 as the result of the revolution and civil war; and in 1991 as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the Baltic and the South Caucasus and Central Asian states gained independence.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union underscored the peril of a chaotic Russia, financially strained and inadequately safeguarding its nuclear arsenal, emphasizing that a weak Russia poses a greater danger.
These experiences in the 1990s bred bitterness and resentment within Russia’s national security establishment towards the West. Perceived underappreciation of Russia’s importance and exceptionalism further fuelled Putin’s popularity, as does the supposed underappreciation of Russia’s importance and exceptionalism, in the world often influenced by internal factors.
To comprehend Vladimir Putin, one must view Russia through the lens of a “theocratic nationalist autocracy,” a term reflective of his philosophical influences. Among his favoured thinkers are Nikolai Berdyaev, Vladimir Solovyov, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and Ivan Ilyin, whom he considers a crucial guide and the foremost fascist thinker since 2005—a revival observed notably in Russia.
Born into nobility in 1883, Ivan Ilyin became a counter-revolutionary after the Bolshevik Revolution, advocating violent means against the revolutionaries. Exiled in 1922, he lived in Berlin until 1938, where he admired Mussolini and Hitler, seeing fascism as the future of politics. Ilyin then moved to Switzerland, where he passed away in 1954, largely forgotten.
According to Timothy Snyder, the fascism of the 1920s and 1930s had three core features: it prioritized will and violence over reason and law, proposed a leader with a mystical connection to the people, and perceived globalization as a conspiracy causing problems. Ilyin’s grandiose visions stem from his devotion to the Orthodox faith, the influence of the Orthodox Church, and the belief in Russian exceptionalism, destined to hold a unique place in the world.
Similar to other authoritarians, Ilyin regarded Russia as an “organism of nature and the soul,” pure and free from original sins. He rejected the existence of Ukraine beyond the Russian organism. Predicting a future where Russia rises with Christian fascism, Ilyin envisioned a time of new development and greatness, aligning with a 19th-century perspective where Russia can do no wrong and only reacts to external wrongs, saving the world not from fascism but with fascism, a world in which facts do not matter and responsibility vanishes.
In response to collapsing empires, history follows a logical course, and Putin, understanding the Zeitgeist, utilizes nationalism to bridge societal rifts. Lacking genuine leadership akin to figures like Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who founded an independent Republic of Turkey out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the tragedy in Russia and Ukraine might have been averted.
In 2005, Putin orchestrated the reburial of Ilyin in Moscow, fully rehabilitating him. Putin employs Ilyin’s fascist ideas in speeches to justify Russia’s actions against the decadent West, the European Union, and the invasion of Ukraine. Putin shares a nostalgia for the former Soviet Union with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who, in his work “Rebuilding Russia: Reflection and Tentative Proposals,” expresses a desire for a slow and gradual restoration, a sentiment echoed by Putin.
The present Russian leadership, predominantly men in their sixties with experiences tied to the Soviet Union’s dissolution, perceives the European Union and the Liberal order as existential threats to autocratic Russia, deeming it the most lawless and unequal country globally. While the EU enforces laws, generates prosperity, and distributes wealth, Putin defends the Hitler-Stalin pact, silences historians, discredits those burdened with a sense of guilt over Russia’s history, and attacks so-called “anti-patriotic elements.”
Though Putin acknowledges Stalinist repressions, he argues for balancing them against Stalin’s achievements, reflecting the public’s generally positive view of Stalin, despite mass repression. Putin’s 2007 speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy foreshadowed his desire to restore Russia to geopolitical relevance. This aspiration is further evident in his 2011 article titled “A New Integration Project for Eurasia: A Future What is Being Born Today.”
He declared that the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space, initiated by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, would evolve into a Eurasian Economic Union. Simultaneously, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were slated to join the original three members. Putin articulated, “We are not stopping at this point and place before ourselves the ambitious task: to go to the next, higher level of integration – a Eurasian Union.” Since 2013, the principles of Eurasia have steered Russian foreign interests.
The influential 1997 book “The Foundations of Geopolitics” by Alexander Dugan significantly shaped much of Russia’s geopolitical doctrine. Dugan, a founder of the Russian Geopolitical School and the Eurasian Movement, is a key figure in modern Russian conservative thought, aligned with Slavophilism. The book, reportedly used as a textbook in the General Staff Academy of the Russian military, advocates ensuring Russia’s supremacy over other powers, especially the US, through the establishment of a Eurasianism countering Atlanticism, pursued by both the EU and America. The objective is to reunite the Soviet Union as a Eurasian entity, not a Russian Empire, with a fundamental principle rejecting Atlanticism, strategic control by the USA, and the dominance of liberal values.
Eurasia aims to restore Russian greatness by weakening and disintegrating the European Union, integrating Europe into the Eurasian Union without adherence to the rule of law or US influence. It seeks to challenge the US-dominated global order and economy, emphasizing the growing power of Eurasia.
Russia’s potential for aggression, illustrated in Budapest, Prague, Afghanistan, and Grozny, demonstrates that once cornered, retreat is seldom considered, favouring a forward attack to the final bitter end. On the flip side, the struggle for global hegemony and increased US influence in the Eurasian Balkans, a part of the Eurasian landmass, makes Ukraine a mere pawn on the global chessboard.
In 2013, Russia turned against the liberal order and the European Union, fabricating fictious problems to distract and blaming the EU for its failures, condemning it as decadent and hostile. This narrative of Western hostility towards Russia is deeply rooted, drawing from historical events like the Patriotic War of 1812, the Crimean War of 1853, and WWII, seen as underappreciation and denial of Russian greatness.
Throughout history, Russia has maintained an adversarial relationship with Europe, reacting aggressively when vital interests were threatened and expanding its territories opportunistically. The provocative actions in Ukraine, Crimea annexation, and intervention in Syria reflected a rational and calculated approach exploiting the weaknesses of the Obama administration.
The justification for the invasion of Ukraine echoes arguments from the 1930s, centred on the principle of intervening to protect those defined as part of one’s own culture. This are the same argument that Hitler used in annexing Austria, partitioning Czechoslovakia, and invading Poland in 1938. The savage war in Ukraine, rooted in myths and Putin’s distorted interpretation of Russia’s history, and the restoration of the “Russian” world, receives support from Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, aligning with Putin’s historical narrative.
Despite being a skilled chess player and strategist, Putin has made a grave strategic mistake with far-reaching consequences. His inner circle, conforming to Kremlin rules, seek to avoid divergence of opinion with the Mandarin, although they may harbour inner doubts, reminiscent of the situation with Leonid Brezhnev before the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Putin’s return to a controlling state, isolating himself from reality, paints a picture of a Russia that will be poorer, more unpredictable, isolated, and unfree—a legacy that someone else will have to grapple with when the time comes for his departure.
Netherlands, WJJH- June 2022 – Updated December 2023
📌 Blog Excerpt
About Vladimir Putin’s rise to power and his strategic decisions, influenced by historical events and fascist thinkers like Ivan Ilyin. Putin’s aggressive foreign policies and nationalist rhetoric are driven by a desire to restore Russia’s global power. His alliances, rejections of Western democracy, and conflicts in Ukraine reflect a calculated pursuit of geopolitical dominance and are the bitter fruits of our common European history.
Refenced links
1. Ukraine, a conflict thirty years in the making
2. A New Integration Project for Eurasia: A Future which is Being Born Today
In what kind of world do we wish to live 
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