The Bombing of Ethics

WWII: The Bombing of Ethics

✍️ Author’s Note

This post examines the strategic bombing campaigns of World War II, and the erosion of moral boundaries in the name of victory. It confronts the uncomfortable reality that ethical lines are often drawn—and erased—by the victors. Whether through Churchill’s unapologetic stance or LeMay’s grim self-awareness, history reminds us: justice and power do not always walk hand in hand.

Churchill: “We should never allow ourselves to apologize for what we did to Germany.”

LeMay: “If I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a war criminal.”

When the chronicles of this period have been written, and we all have returned to dust, achievements will have crumbled into the annals of history. Our actions, which bear witness to our legal, moral, and ethical norms and standing, will all be part of the chronicles for eternity.

In the decades since the great war, diverse perspectives have emerged regarding the RAF’s strategy of terror bombings over Germany, which can be summarized as the “Bombings of Ethics (1).” Some have contested the existence of a deliberate strategy, others have criticized the targeting of innocent civilians, while some have defended Air Marshal Arthur Harris’s bombings of civilian populations.

It is tragic to the extent these differences in appreciation may detracts from the valour of Bomber Command personnel, who with a mortality rate of 69,2 % of the Royal Airforce, paid the ultimate price. Post-war, it became soon evident that many politicians and civilians preferred collective amnesia about the role the bombers played against Germany. Meanwhile, others posed the challenging questions of moral justification, “How could you do this, How could you daily bomb innocent women and children.”

Frankly, this question is deemed unjust and addressed to the wrong people. These were men with great courage, individuals who played Russian roulette with death, many carrying enduring mental scars. Their actions, dictated by orders for the survival of Britain, deserve recognition beyond moral scrutiny.

Historian Max Hastings contributes to the discourse with his book “Bomber Command (2),” offering a comprehensive account of the ever-evolving nighttime air war over Germany. Hastings contends that Britain’s bombing campaign was largely ineffective, questioning the morality of “area” bombing.

Sir Winston Churchill’s post-war note to former Bomber Command staff officer John Lawrence reveals a perspective less concerned with moral reflection. In the note, Churchill asserts:

“WE SHOULD NEVER ALLOW OURSELVES TO APOLOGIZE FOR WHAT WE DID TO GERMANY (6).”

Sir Winston Churchill

In essence, the comment delves into the multifaceted nature of historical perspectives on wartime strategies, the toll on those executing them, and the varying degrees of moral consideration at different levels of leadership.

However, this deserves more introspection in today’s environment, given recent conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, and Israel, where similar tactics of area bombing have been employed. These events should not fade from our collective memory like strangers passing in the night. There is a moral argument to be made against terror bombings, re-housing strategies, and the perceived necessity of sinking to the depths of the aggressor. The bombings of Dresden, Hamburg, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and Tokyo should be considered war crimes.

War is uniquely terrifying and inevitably destructive, disproportionately affecting civilians as the primary victims. Despite targeting of civilians has been prohibited in Article 25 of the 1899 Hague Conventions, and the 1907 Hague Convention states “the attack or bombardments, by whatever means of towns, villages dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.” Recent conflicts continue to challenge these principles.

The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, expanded on the law of armed conflict, emphasizing the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution.

Today, Article 51 of Geneva Protocol I explicitly prohibits the bombardment that treats multiple clearly separated and distinct military objectives within a city as a single military target. Acts such as scorched-earth warfare, saturation bombings by the U.S. in Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Iraq, Russian terror attacks in Ukraine, and Israel’s de-housing and collective punishment of Palestinians in Gaza are deemed unlawful.

Reflecting on the great wars, particularly World War II (1939–1945), the most destructive conflict in history, it was often perceived as a “moral war” or a “total war,” polarizing society in its views on humanity. Tens of thousands of civilians lost their lives, with the Holocaust alone claiming six million Jewish lives. The war’s toll exceeded 50 million lives lost and hundreds of millions wounded.

A total war which took more lives of civilians than combatants, a war without restraint in warfare in which moral responsibility becomes problematic. A war in which the defenders of the light in the pursuit of defeating the followers of the darkness used the same brutal and vicious tactics, is a testament to the complexities of morality in the midst of conflict.

Before the great war, the American State Department asserted that “civilian bombings are in violation of the most elementary principles of those standards of human conduct which have been an essential part of civilization.” In 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt condemned civilian bombing as “inhuman barbarism.”

Up until 1944, American officers recognized the value of the principle that civilian population, along with schools, churches, and homes, should not be targeted for bombing.  They were very wary of the ethical problems arising from indiscriminately bombing of civilians and pursued a “tactical” or “precision” bombing doctrine.  This approach aimed to exclusively target German military and industrial facilities rather than bomb entire urban “areas.”

However, British officers disagreed on this principle fervently, lacking consensus. Already in July 1940 after the German bombings of Warsaw, Rotterdam, Coventry, and Southampton the idea of terror bombings took root with Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff.

Portal was one of the earliest proponents of mass morale attacks against the German people, also much in the bellicose spirit of Churchill for revenge. On September 1, 1940, Portal suggested that twenty German towns might be proscribed. Although the Prime Minister was the foremost advocate city bombing and was urging and endorsed the attacks himself, he remained ambivalent about area bombings, expressing reservations about the potential impact on German morale.  

This ambivalence echoed Churchill’s 1917 statement: “It is improbable that any terrorization of the civil population which could be achieved by air attack would compel the Government of a great nation to surrender (5).” In his October 7, 1941 response to Sir Charles Portal, Churchill noted “one has to do the best one can, but he is an unwise man who thinks there is any certain method of winning or indeed any other war between equals in strength.”

The principle of precision bombing and avoiding indiscriminate civilian targeting was abandoned by the British in early 1942 when Portal approved a list of 20 German cities as potential targets. This shift marked a departure from the initial focus on minimizing civilian casualties, turning the by-product of bombings into the end-product.

In 1945, under the command of General Curtis LeMay, the Americans expanded their policies of targeting innocent civilians to Japanese cities by dropping incendiary bombs filled with phosphorus (later napalm). In one day, LeMay’s flying fortresses caused the death of 84,000 people, just before the atomic bomb demonstrated its immense intensity and destructive power.

LeMay, who had been active in the European theatre of war, proved remarkably effective with his relentless firebombing campaign in Japan, scorching more than 60 cities and leaving only 6 standing before the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, ultimately leading to Japan’s surrender.

While not diminishing the ruthlessness of Germany and Japan, as evidenced by German attacks on Britain and Europe and Japanese area attacks on Chongqing, the shift in policy by Britain and America from respecting the rights of innocent civilians to specifically targeting them, shows humanity a mirror of the monstrous nature of war and the erosion of moral values in our global society.

While it may be morally permissible to attack specific military targets, such as factories, oil plants, or railway centres, even at the incidental risk to life and property, it is immoral to intentionally attack life and property. The systematic attacks against cities largely inhabited by non-combatants sacrificed much of the Allies’ moral case and contributed substantially to the moral collapse during WWII, particularly in the treatment of prisoners and civilians.

The RAF’s policies evolved over time in favour of area bombing. The “Cherwell Memorandum” on March 30, 1942, authored by Professor Lindemann, 1st Viscount Cherwell, a devoted advocate of levelling Germany, played a crucial role in reinforcing Winston Churchill’s thinking for area bombing with “absolutely devastating exterminating attacks” against German cities.

Under the autocratic leadership of Air Marshal Arthur Harris, appointed in February 1942 as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Bomber Command, the RAF’s area bombing policy was implemented. This approach, initiated by the Air Ministry’s area bombing directive of February 14, 1942, removed all constraints on bombing policies against German cities.

Until the end of 1945, Air Marshal Arthur Harris, also known as “Bomber” Harris in the British press, and “Butcher” or “Butch” Harris in the RAF, was responsible for executing the RAF’s area bombing policy aimed at destroying “the morale of the enemy population,” and was also the man who has been criticized most for it.

Harris faced severe criticism for his role, and after his retirement in September 1945, questions arose regarding the morality and efficacy of saturation bombing. Harris was subsequently rejected as a candidate to lead the post-war RAF.

Disappointed by the reappraisal of his war aims and methods, Harris authored an honest yet blunt book defending Bomber Command’s achievements in “Bomber Offensive (3).” In this work, he attacked those daring to propose alternatives to the Harris-way, advocating for the annihilation and extinction of Germany. However, the book lacked much reflection or a willingness to admit his own mistakes.

Harris harboured lasting resentment towards Churchill for the Prime Minister’s mute disavowal of the strategic offensive at the war’s end. Churchill’s refusal to authorize a Bomber Command campaign medal only intensified Harris’s animosity.  In 1947 moved to Rhodesia to command a small air force in support of retaining white minority rule in southern Africa.

The practice of “Aerial bombardment” was first practiced by Italy, under the command of General Giulio Douhet, in Libya during Italy’s war with the Ottoman Empire (1911–12). Douhet was among one of the most influential military theorists of his age and understood the potential of air power and expounded his theories on the role of strategic bombing in disorganizing and annihilating an enemy’s war effort.

Harris, influenced by Douhet’s strategic bombing theories, developed the saturation technique of mass bombing. This involved concentrating clouds of bombers in a massive raid on a single city, with the goal of demolishing its civilian quarters.

Harris employed a de facto strategy of civilian terror-bombing, maintaining plausible deniability by asserting the “intention” was to destroy buildings, not civilians. Nonetheless, the method used aimed to be as effective as possible at killing city residents.

Area bombings was deliberately targeting German civilians designed to destroy civilian morale in Germany, create a refugee crisis, demoralize the population, and thus defeat the Third Reich from within. Portal quantified the purpose of the bomber offensive, envisioning the destruction of 6 million German dwellings, leaving 25 million people homeless, with civilian casualties estimated at around 900,000 killed and 1,000,000 seriously wounded. The Chiefs of Staff endorsed Portal’s plan on December 31, 1942, recommending a force of 3,000 heavy and medium bombers by the end of 1943.

Post-war calculations by the Federal Statistic Office in Wiesbaden revealed that 593,000 civilians died, and 3.37 million dwellings were destroyed, including 600,000 in Berlin from 1939 to 1945.

The Americans, much to their credit were indifferent to the ideas of the British and rejected the concept of area bombing for the purpose of attacking the enemy morale. Despite Harris’s belief in 1942 that he could bring Germany to its knees by 1944 without ground force intervention, Churchill never accepted these predictions. The bomber offensive in 1941 and 1942 was seen by Churchill as a means of boosting British morale, deterring premature American involvement in a second front, and responding to Stalin’s call for a second front to alleviate pressure on Russia.

Undoubtedly, personal experiences, such as my dad’s delight in hearing the heavy bombers on their way to Nazi Germany, illustrate the complex and multifaceted nature of perceptions during wartime, often unaware of the actual effectiveness of the bombing campaigns.

Air Marshal Arthur Harris explicitly confirmed to Sir Arthur Street, Under Secretary of State, Air Ministry, October 25, 1943:

 “THE DESTRUCTION OF GERMAN CITIES, THE KILLING OF GERMAN WORKERS, AND THE DISRUPTION OF CIVILISED COMMUNITY LIFE THROUGHOUT GERMANY [IS THE GOAL]. … IT SHOULD BE EMPHASISED THAT THE DESTRUCTION OF HOUSES, PUBLIC UTILITIES, TRANSPORT AND LIVES; THE CREATION OF A REFUGEE PROBLEM ON AN UNPRECEDENTED SCALE; AND THE BREAKDOWN OF MORALE BOTH AT HOME AND AT THE BATTLE FRONTS BY FEAR OF EXTENDED AND INTENSIFIED BOMBING ARE ACCEPTED AND INTENDED AIMS OF OUR BOMBING POLICY. THEY ARE NOT BY-PRODUCTS OF ATTEMPTS TO HIT FACTORIES (9).”

Air marchall arthur harris

However, not everyone shared Harris’s enthusiasm, and dissent emerged from various circles. The Royal Navy deplored the significant resources attributed to Bomber Command, seeing them as better employed elsewhere. Major-General J.F.C. Fuller and military historian Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, known as Captain Liddell Hart, military historian, and military theorist, influential among strategists, mounted a significant campaign against the systematic destruction, opposing the offenses and the rising tide of systematic destruction.

Liddell Hart, in particular, viewed morale bombing as incompatible with the doctrine of enforcing unconditional German surrender. He vehemently attacked the bomber offensive through articles, magazines, and books. Reflecting on the 1,046-bomber raid on Cologne, which set the city ablaze from end to end, he wrote in his diary in the summer of 1942:

“IT WILL BE IRONICAL IF THE DEFENDERS OF CIVILIZATION DEPEND FOR VICTORY UPON THE MOST BARBARIC, AND UNSKILLED, WAY OF WINNING A WAR THAT THE MODERN WORLD HAS EVER SEEN…  WE ARE NOW COUNTING FOR VICTORY ON SUCCESS IN THE WAY OF DEGRADING IT TO A NEW LOW LEVEL – AS REPRESENTED BY INDISCRIMINATE (NIGHT) BOMBING AND STARVATION (10).”

Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart

The British “de-housing” strategy, advocated  by scientists, civil servants, RAF officers, politicians, and Harris throughout the war about bombing civilian targets, can be argued to have rested on -and gained validity from- the widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the German economy. Until the end of 1943, Germany did not operate as a war economy, and there were misconceptions about the nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial bombardment.

As Karin Schreiter highlights in “Revisiting Morale under the Bombs 1942-1945“referring to the “Volksgemeinschaft” and the need for more understanding of the complex German war time morale:

“THE ALLIES BELIEVED THAT THE GERMAN POPULATION, IF PUT UNDER SUFFICIENT MATERIAL AND SOCIAL PRESSURE, WOULD EVENTUALLY LOSE FAITH IN ITS LEADERSHIP, AND THE HOMEFRONT WOULD CONSEQUENTLY COLLAPSE, REPEATING THE SITUATION OF 1918 AND LEADING TO A QUICKER END OF THE WAR, YET EVEN DURING THE HEAVEST BOMBING IN 1944-1945 THERE WAS NEITHER WIDESPREAD ORGANISED DISSENT AGAINST THE NAZI REGIME OR ANY STRIKE ACTIO IN THE WAR INDUSTRY. RESEACH INDICATES THAT BOMBINGS FAILED TO INCITE MAJOR PANIC OR SUSTAINED CHAOS (6).”

Karin Schreiter

Despite the lack of consensus and moral ambiguity between the British and the Americans, a de facto strategy of civilian terror-bombing prevailed. British area bombing raids were conducted in tandem with American precision bombing of specific military and industrial sites by day.

The area bombings, carried out by night against whole cities with incendiary devices meant to cause monstrous firestorms, occurred in Berlin, Darmstadt, Dresden, Hamburg, Kassel, and other cities. The British viewed the unspeakable realities of mass death, mostly of civilians, as a small price to save civilization from tyranny and fascism. However, the British ignored, in war, a moral distinction must be made between the incidental and deliberate destruction of civilian life, and the destruction of Dresden, Darmstadt, or Kassel were acts of savagery.

The destruction of Dresden, in the final weeks of the war, known as “the Florence on the Elbe,” a city representing the finest, most beautiful, and cultured aspects of Germany, generated growing public distaste. US Secretary of War Stimson reflected in his diary about Dresden, stating that the destruction, even on its face, appeared terrible and probably unnecessary. After Dresden, Stimson, a person of high moral standing and principled realism, explicitly stated that the United States did not engage in terror bombing of cities.

This questioning of civilian bombing practices was not shared by General George C Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army, or British Air Marshal Arthur Harris. However, even during the heaviest bombings between 1943 and 1945, no widespread organized dissent formed against the Nazi regime. By the spring of 1944, it became evident that the strategic justification for the wholesale destruction of German cities had already dissipated. In fact, “the five-month campaign to bomb Germany into capitulation by repeatedly striking Berlin had been a complete failure.”

In retrospect, the incendiary bombing campaigns, unleashing massive firestorms on the cities of Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo were deemed immoral, disregarding the most basic standards of morality, and resulting in indiscriminately targeting and killing of innocent men, women, and children. Bombing medieval cities like Wurzburg or Pforzheim, devoid of any military significance, is hard to justify in terms of shortening the war.

In retrospect, the incendiary bombing campaigns, unleashing massive firestorms on cities like Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo, were deemed immoral, disregarding the most basic standards of morality and resulting in the indiscriminate targeting and killing of innocent men, women, and children. Bombing medieval cities like Wurzburg or Pforzheim, devoid of any military significance, is hard to justify in terms of shortening the war.

Prime Minister Winston Churchill, primarily concerned with what was strategically desirable and tactically possible, did not express reservations about the “absolutely devastating exterminating” attacks against the Nazi homeland, aligning with his character.

As General Sir Frederick Pile told Basil Liddell Hart, “Winston is pinning all his faith on the bombing offensive now. The devastation it causes suits his temperament, and he would be disappointed at a less destructive ending to the war.”(9) Nevertheless, Sir Winston Churchill, not really a bleeding-heart liberal, more like a British Bulldog, also had reflective moments. He is quoted in the diary of Lord Richard Casey, June 27, 1943:

“TONIGHT, AT CHEQUERS IN THE COURSE OF A FILM SHOWING THE BOMBING OF GERMAN TOWNS FROM THE AIR VERY WELL AND DRAMATICALLY DONE, WSC (I.E. CHURCHILL) SUDDENLY SAT BOLT UPRIGHT AND SAID TO ME, ‘ARE WE BEASTS? ARE WE TAKING THIS TOO FAR? (11) ”

Lord Richard Casey

The American doctrine of precision bombing remained intact throughout 1943 and 1944, causing disagreements with the British, who simultaneously pursued their area bombing campaign. The Casablanca Allied conference in 1943 synchronized American and British bombing policies, embarking on the progressive destruction of the German military, industrial, and economic system, formalized in the Pointblank directive, in preparation for the delayed Operation Overlord.

For Harris, area bombing was based on his conviction that there was a direct correlation between acres of concentrated aerial devastation and lost industrial man-hours. It should not be ignored that only 48% of German manufacturing was allocated in the 58 towns attacked in strength by Bomber Command.

Harris’s conviction turned into an obsession, as he clung to this ineffective strategy and resisted cooperating with the USAAF and its approach to strategic bombing. This obsession led Harris to the level of insubordination, refusing to send his bombers to the ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt and avoiding sending his bombers until February 1944 after oil production facilities because he was determined to continue his policy of area bombing of German cities.

After the disastrous second Schweinfurt raid in October 1943, the USAF followed the RAF but continued to pursue both area and precision bombing until the end of the war in Europe. The dubious change in strategy drained considerable resources from the American precision bombing campaign. Ceasing the attacks on the ball-bearing industry and proceeding with pointless area bombings at the end of 1943 allowed the Nazi regime, to its amazement and relief, to recover and disperse ball-bearing production, escaping a decisive blow against armaments production. Evidence suggests that continued attacks on vital industries, particularly oil and ball-bearing production, could have ended the war in 1943 or 1944.

Despite the success of the “Oil Plan” by General Carl Spaatz against Germany’s synthetic oil production facilities in the spring of 1944, which demonstrated the effectiveness of precision bombing and severely affected Germany’s petroleum supply, the British Chiefs of Staff clung to their strategy of area bombing. They did not participate in the bombings of synthetic oil plants and instead demanded a renewed assault on German civilian morale to bring about a complete collapse of the Reich without a land invasion. A memo from July 1944 stated:

he American doctrine of precision bombing remained intact throughout 1943 and 1944, and caused disagreements with the British, who simultaneously would pursue their area bombing campaign.

The Casablanca allied conference in 1943 the American and British bombing policies were synchronised and they embarked on the progressive destruction of the German military, industrial and economic system, formalised in the Pointblank directive, in preparation of the delayed operation Overlord.

For Harris area bombing was based on his conviction that there was a direct correlation between acres of concentrated areal devastation and lost-industrial manhours. It should not be ignored that only 48% of German manufacturing was allocated in the 58 towns attacked in strength by Bomber Command.

Harris religion, turned into an obsession, as he was clinging to this ineffective strategy and resisting cooperating with the USAAF and its approach of strategic bombing.

This obsession brought Harris to the level of insubordination refusing to send his bombers to the ball-bearing factories at Schweinfurt and avoiding sending his bombers in 1943 until February 1944 after oil production facilities, because he was determined to continue his policy of area bombing of German cities.

After the disastrous and traumatic second Schweinfurt raid in October 1943, the USAF followed the RAF but continued to pursue both area and precision bombing until the end of the war in Europe. The dubious change in strategy drained considerable resources from the American precision bombing campaign.

Ceasing the attacks on the ball-bearing industry and proceeding with the pointless area bombings at the end of 1943 allowed the Nazi regime, to its amazement and relief, to recover and disperse ball-bearing production and escape a decisive blow against the armaments production. Evidence suggests continued attacks on vital industries, particularly oil and ball-bearing production, could have ended the war in 1943 or 1944.

Despite the success of the “Oil Plan” of General Carl Spaatz, against Germany’s synthetic oil production facilities in the spring of 1944, which showed the effect precision bombing had and severely affected the available petroleum available to Germany. The British Chiefs of Staff clung to their strategy of area bombing and did not take part in the bombings of the synthetic oil plants and began demanding the renewed assault on German civilian morale, to bring about a complete collapse of the Reich without a land invasion, according to this memo of July 1944:

“THE TIME MIGHT WELL COME IN THE NOT-SO-DISTANT FUTURE WHEN AN ALL-OUT ATTACK BY EVERY MEANS AT OUR DISPOSAL ON GERMAN CIVILIAN MORALE MIGHT BE DECISIVE…THE METHOD OF SUCH AN ATTACK WOULD BE CARRIED OUT SHOULD BE EXAMED AND ALL POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS MADE (12).”

The British Chiefs of Staff MEMO TO PM WINSTON CHURCHILL

Whatever justification Harris may have expressed, such as “they started it” or “this is the way war works,” and “civilians are regrettable collateral damages” the fact remains that this was a war waged against civilians, resulting in the intentional killing of as many civilians as possible. This set the stage for the infamous air raid by Bomber Command and the American 5th Air Force between February 13 and 15, 1945, on Dresden, which destroyed the city and killed a minimum of 30,000 and perhaps as many as 100,000 people. Dresden, a city of no significant industrial capacity, was attacked in the final weeks of the war, making it a symbolic act that appeared to have little relation to hastening the war’s end.

By August 1944, Harris and Bomber Command primarily focused on destroying as many German cities as possible, regardless of whether it had any strategic military value. They received permission to resume delusional area bombing attacks on twelve German cities. The Directorate of Bomber Operations, previously focused on destroying structures and housing, now explicitly acknowledged the intention to create civilian casualties, reversing its earlier deniability:

“IF WE ASSUME THAT THE DAYTIME POPULATION OF THE AREA ATTACKED IS 300,000, WE MAY EXPECT 220,000 CASULTIES, 50 PERCENT OF THESE OR 110,000 MAY EXPECT TO BE KILLED. IT IS SUGGESTED THAT SUCH AN ATTACK RESULTING IN SO MANY DEATHS, THE GREAT PROPORTION OF WHICH WILL BE KEY PERSONAL, CANNOT HELP BUT HAVE A SHATTERING EFFECT ON POLITICAL AND CIVILIAN MORALE ALL OVER GERMANY (13).”

THE DIRECTORATE OF BOMBER OPERATIONS CALCULATIONS

In February 1945, after American commanders finally agreed to bombard Berlin, foregoing the strategy of targeting only military sites, a “moral threshold” was crossed. This made everything else, including the fire bombings and atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, more acceptable. As Max Hastings concludes:

“By the spring of 1944, it was clear that Harris’s AREA BOMBING campaign had failed to bring Germany within even distant sight of defeat. The obliteration of German cities in the spring of 1945, when all strategic justification had vanished, is a lasting blot on the Allied conduct of the war and on the judgement of senior Allied airmen (14).”

MAX HASTINGS

As time ran out for Harris and his obsession with wild claims and ambitious promises, disillusionment set in, damaging his reputation. Even Prime Minister Winston Churchill, likely motivated by political expediency, criticized and distanced himself from Bomber Command and Harris when he noted in a Memo to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chief of Air Staff on March 28, 1945:

“IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE MOMENT HAS COME WHEN THE QUESTION OF BOMBING OF GERMAN CITIES SIMPLY FOR THE SAKE OF INCREASING THE TERROR, THOUGH UNDER OTHER PRETEXTS, SHOULD BE REVIEWED. OTHERWISE, WE SHALL COME INTO CONTROL OF AN UTTERLY RUINED LAND. … THE DESTRUCTION OF DRESDEN REMAINS A SERIOUS QUERY AGAINST THE CONDUCT OF ALLIED BOMBING. … I FEEL THE NEED FOR MORE PRECISE CONCENTRATION UPON MILITARY OBJECTIVES, SUCH AS OIL AND COMMUNICATIONS BEHIND THE IMMEDIATE BATTLE-ZONE, RATHER THAN ON MERE ACTS OF TERROR AND WANTON DESTRUCTION, HOWEVER IMPRESSIVE (15).”

WINSTON CCHURCHILL Memo to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chief of Air Staff

While the victors of war often dictate the historical narrative, Prime Minister Churchill’s characterization of “acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive” serves as a noteworthy summary. Others may denounce them as repugnant crimes against humanity or war crimes, leading to the construction of gallows in Nuremberg and Tokyo. Reflecting on the morality of such actions against civilian populations in Germany and Japan, General Curtis LeMay later expressed candid acknowledgment:

“I SUPPOSE IF I HAD LOST THE WAR, I WOULD HAVE BEEN TRIED AS A WAR CRIMINAL, FORTUNATELY, WE WERE ON THE WINNING SIDE…. ALL WAR IS IMMORAL, AND IF YOU LET IT BOTHER YOU, YOU ARE NOT A GOOD SOLDIER.”

GENERAL CURTIS LEMAY

The 21st century reflects back to humanity, affirming the erosion of moral values that govern our global society. It underscores that “naked acts of terror and wanton destruction” are not confined to the past but persist in the present. Among those deemed responsible, figures such as George W. Bush, Vladimir Putin, and Benjamin Netanyahu stand out as main instigators.

Netherlands, William J J Houtzager, Aka WJJH – November 2023

📌 Blog Excerpt

Reflection on the controversial strategy of terror bombing; delving into the ethical, moral, and strategic debates surrounding the WWII bombing campaigns, particularly the RAF’s area bombing policy, the indiscriminate bombing of civilians and its impact on civilian populations. Discussing the justification, devastating effects, and the erosion of moral values. Various perspectives, including those of military leaders and historians, are examined, shedding light on the complexities and implications of such strategies.

References:

1. MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND, TITLE: ‘THE BOMBING OF ETHICS” A QUOTE PHRASED BY CHAPLAIN REV. JOH. COLLINS, AFTER A LECTURE BY HARRY WALDON “THE ETHIC OF BOMBING” AT WYCOMBE PP 320
2. Max Hastings, Bomber Command: The Myths and Realities of the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939-1945 (NY: The Dial Press, 1979)
3. Arthur Travers Harris, Bomber Offensive (1947) Macmillan Company, (1990) Greenhill Books
4. Tami Biddle, RHETORIC AND REALITY IN AIR WARFARE: THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN IDEAS ABOUT STRATEGIC BOMBING, 1914-1945 (PRINCETON, NJ: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2002).
5. MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND, WINSTON CHURCHILL DISMISSEL OF ARGUMENT FOR  MORAL BOMBINGS 1917. P. 46
6. KARIN SCHREITER REVISITING MORALE UNDER THE BOMBS 1942-1945 Central European History, vol. 50, no. 3, 2017, pp. 347–74.
7. MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND, SCRIBBLED NOTE Winston CHURCHILL. P. 125.
8. MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND, THE CHERWILL MEMORANDUM OF MARCH 30, 1942, BY PROFESSOR LINDEMANN, P 152-154
9. TAMI BIDDLE, RHETORIC AND REALITY IN AIR WARFARE. SIR HARRIS CONFIRMATION TO SIR ARTHUR STREET, P. 220.
10. MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND, REFLECTIONS BASIL LIDDELL HART, P. 219.
11. MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND, QUOTE DAIRY LORD RICHARD CASEY, JUNE 27, 1943, P 128
12. MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND, BRITSH CHIEFS OF STAFFS STRATEGY OF AREAL BOMBING MEMO JULY 1944, P 389
13. MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND, DIRECTORATE OF BOMBER COMMAND PURPOSE BOMBINGS, P 389
14. MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND, HASTINGS NOTES “THE OBLITERATION OF GERMAN CITIES IN THE SPRING OF 1945, WHEN ALL STRATEGIC JUSTIFICATION HAD VANISHED, IS A LASTING BLOT ON THE ALLIED CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND ON THE JUDGEMENT OF SENIOR ALLIED AIRMEN”. P 455
15. MAX HASTINGS, BOMBER COMMAND, P.M. CHURCHILL MEMO TO THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF, MARCH 28, 1945, P 448