The Saga of American-Russian Antagonism

The Saga of American-Russian Antagonism

✍️ Author’s Note

This reflection explores one of the most enduring and consequential rivalries of modern history: the antagonism between the United States and Russia. What began as an ideological standoff between capitalism and communism evolved into a prolonged struggle for influence, marked by suspicion, missed opportunities, and repeated cycles of confrontation.

In writing this piece, I sought not only to revisit familiar milestones of the Cold War and its aftermath but also to question the choices made on both sides. Could the collapse of the Soviet Union have opened the way for cooperation rather than renewed hostility? Why did the language of rivalry continue to dominate, even as the world shifted into a multipolar reality?

This post is less about rehearsing old grievances and more about understanding the patterns of mistrust that still shape global politics. The saga of American-Russian antagonism is not just a story of two nations—it is a mirror for how power, pride, and fear can define international relations.

History is a gallery of pictures in which there are few originals and many copies.”

— Alexis de Tocqueville

In the annals of time, when the dust settles and our achievements are but echoes in history, the narrative of America’s dominance and the ongoing antagonistic relationship with Russia will endure in perpetuity. As a singular minority, the realist within me acknowledges the universal pursuit of power by nations, irrespective of their regimes. In a world where liberalism stands as a force for good, preferable to communism and fascism, I have been fortunate to always reside in countries that safeguard individual rights and liberal values.

Nevertheless, the dream of universalizing liberal democracy is a lofty one. The belief in its potential universality clashes with the reality that diverse societies possess distinct ideological, ethical, moral, and political values. Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History” proposed a vision where liberal democracies would prevail globally, disputes would vanish, and great power wars would cease post the Cold War. However, this utopian vision has faced critique, notably in Fukuyama’s later work, “After the Neocons – America at the Crossroads,” which scrutinizes the flaws in the omnipotence of liberal democracy and capitalist economy.

Machiavelli’s wisdom holds true—humanity lacks a common culture, and given ideological differences, distinctions persist and must be acknowledged. This acknowledgment clashes with American principles, as highlighted by Dr Henry Kissinger, who noted “Americans belief that their principles are universal” implying that non-liberal governments are “less than fully legitimate.”

The tension between Liberalism, Nationalism, and Realism precludes a universal truth or a world state. Attempts to impose Western liberal values on foreign nations risk perpetuating endless wars. John J Mearsheimer’s “The Great Delusion – Liberal Dreams and International Realities” advocates for a strategy of restraint based on the balance of power politics, an approach applicable to the US-Russia relationship.

The roots of the US-Russia antagonistic relationship delve into the influence of George F. Kennan, a career diplomat and former ambassador to the Soviet Union. Kennan, driven by a disdain for Soviet communism, articulated the “containment and encircling” doctrine. His 1946 “Long Telegram” and 1947 article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” advocated for containing and straining Soviet power, discouraging cooperation, and endorsing military encirclement.

Russia, historically perceived as a great but weakened nation, faced nuclear scenarios post-World War II. Kennan’s focus on the unique evil of communist totalitarianism shaped US policy. However, internal weaknesses in communism, evident in the monolithic party dictatorship, made the collapse of the Soviet command economy inevitable. Gorbachev’s attempts at reform faced the “Hungarian complex,” fearing upheaval from below.

Post-WWII, the US, plagued by paranoia, embraced McCarthyism and an enduring obsession with Russia and communism. Kennan recognized that even if Russia were to vanish, the military-industrial complex would persist. President Truman’s annual defence budget increases, fuelled by Cold War rhetoric, led to an overstretched hegemon with an imbalanced defence strategy under the Truman Doctrine of containment, under which the United States pledged to contain communism by providing political, economic, and military support to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces.

Thus, the saga of American-Russian antagonism, from Kennan’s doctrines to the present, weaves a complex tapestry shaped by geopolitical ideologies, historical fears, and the perennial struggle for power.

In 1948, the tool of economic sanctions was deployed against Russia, imposing a range of restrictions on doing business with the Soviet Union, leading to an Iron Curtain around Eastern European nations. The US Department of Commerce restricted the export of strategic materials, equipment, and weapons to the USSR and its Eastern European allies. These restrictions were later formalized in the Export Control Act of 1949. This instrument of economic pressure resurfaced during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), which prompted a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Subsequently, the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations have all employed sanctions against Russia from 2014 onwards.

From George F. Kennan to Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Brett Scowcroft, a common thread of great power realism and a strategy based on the balance of powers persisted. Zbigniew Brzezinski, in “The Grand Chessboard of American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives,” bluntly outlined a vision of American pre-eminence in the 21st century. He argued for America to become the sole arbiter in Eurasia, preventing the rise of any rival power.

Brzezinski’s warning about a potential coalition of China, Russia, and Iran as an “antihegemonic” force underscores the evolving geopolitical landscape. Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts in the 1980s, marked by Glasnost and Perestroika, aimed to reduce Cold War tensions and reform Russia towards democratic governance. Gorbachev recognized the imperative to avoid nuclear war, emphasizing the need to halt the nuclear arms race.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked a triumph of capitalism over communism, according to Ronald Reagan communism headed “for the dustbin of history.” However, Russia, driven by a sense of exceptionalism, failed to fully integrate into Europe, as observed by Turgenev in the 19th century, “The delusion of Russian greatness has not helped its integration into Europe.” Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasized that Europe presented Russia’s only viable geostrategic option for international relevance.

The years of change (1989-2001) saw collaboration between H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, culminating in the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). However, the subsequent decision to place Russia on the periphery rather than fostering a long-term partnership proved to be a short-sighted strategy. Ignoring Russia’s potential as a global partner contributed to the breakdown of democracy in Russia and the rise of authoritarianism.

The EU’s relationship with the US, defined as an “Equal partnership,” has often been a façade, with the EU enlargement expansion, slowing down the EU integration, more in US interests as noted by Brzezinski.

“A larger Europe will expand the range of American influence—and, through the admission of new Central European members, also increase in the European councils the number of states with a pro-American proclivity—without simultaneously creating a Europe politically so integrated that it could soon challenge the United States on geopolitical matters of high importance to America elsewhere.”

Europe’s reliance on the US, especially in matters concerning Israel and the Middle East, has weakened and continues to weaken its geopolitical standing. Europe’s role as a junior partner allows the US to expand its economic and geopolitical influence.

For Russia, the dissolution of the Soviet Union left emotional scars, leading to feelings of humiliation and resentment. Marginalization in international institutions after Glasnost and Perestroika, coupled with a lack of respect from the West, further fuelled these sentiments. Zbigniew Brzezinski’s view on the costs of excluding Russia echoes in today’s events, emphasizing the potential destabilization resulting from the dilution of the EU or NATO.

After Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin emerged as a pragmatic leader, elected in 2000. Putin’s leadership, marked by cynicism and a cold-eyed approach, followed a period of unwarranted marginalization, and has shaped Russia’s stance on global issues.

In retrospect, the moment Vladimir Putin assumed the presidency in 2000 marked a departure from Western liberal democracy. Putin, advocating for foreign investment, rejected Western values as incompatible with Russian principles. He openly pursued an Andropov-style absolute authority, curbing the influence of capitalist oligarchs and asserting government control over strategic industries like Gazprom, Rosneft, and Rostec.

While the West applauded Putin as a pragmatist, President George W. Bush’s trusting assessment in 2001 displayed a level of misunderstanding and naivety about global dynamics. This reflects a recurring theme of American unawareness or intentional ignorance about the broader world, its cultures, and histories, complicating confident and competent engagement with global issues.

The arrival of the 21st century under President George W. Bush’s administration saw a shift in policies, reminiscent of Henry Cabot Lodge’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. Bush’s attack on multilateralism, coined as “multilaterism a la carte,” coupled with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and encouragement for Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO, played a pivotal role in shaping today’s challenges. This selective approach to multilateralism was evident in rejecting various treaties, weakening international law, and undermining institutions like the UN and the International Criminal Court.

The Iraq War marked a turning point, eroding the US’s moral authority and global leadership. The Bush administration’s actions set in motion a decline in the era of Western dominance that had spanned roughly five-hundred years. The negative dynamic in the Russia-US relationship, marked by pervasive mistrust, has also shaped Putin’s policies. Russia claims that the US exploited its vulnerabilities post-Cold War, expanding NATO eastwards, a sentiment echoed by George F. Kennan.

Kennan, the architect of America’s Cold War policy, warned against NATO expansion in 1998, foreseeing a new Cold War. Despite Kennan’s concerns, NATO expanded, bringing it to the Russian Federation’s border. This expansion, coupled with actions in Serbia, Iraq, Libya, and interference in Russia’s internal affairs, heightened tensions. The West’s failure to understand and underestimate Russia, fuelled by a self-serving approach to international law, has contributed to the direct confrontation between the US and Russia since 2014. The difference in perspectives within the international community, the lack of pragmatism, and the transformation of the American-Russian relationship into a direct confrontation have become increasingly evident.

Netherlands, William J J Houtzager, Aka WJJH , January 2023

📌Blog Excerpt

A reflection on the long and uneasy relationship between the United States and Russia. From the Cold War’s ideological clash to today’s geopolitical tensions, this post traces the recurring patterns of mistrust, pride, and missed opportunities that have defined one of history’s most consequential rivalries.