Ukraine, the Fruits of Delusion and Hubris: What Follows is Nemesis
✍️ Author’s Note
This reflection draws on classical tragedy to examine the consequences of unchecked ambition and moral absolutism in Ukraine. It questions whether we are already on the path from hubris to downfall—and what lesson history may soon teach.

Introduction
In Greek myth and tragedy, hubris (or hybris) represents the pretension to be godlike, disregarding the divine balance among God, man, and nature. This concept echoes in geopolitics, often leading politicians and media astray. Such was the case in 1853 when Russia clashed with the Ottoman Empire over Crimea, a focal point revisited when Russian President Vladimir Putin seized the same territory in 2014.
Historical Parallels
There are notable parallels between the 1850s, when Crimea was part of the Russian Empire under Czar Nicholas I, and today. Historian Orlando Figes, in his book “The Crimean War: A History,” wrote, “The savage Crimean War (1853-1856) killed almost one million soldiers and civilians. It enmeshed four great empires—the British, French, Turkish, and Russian—in a battle over religion as well as territory; and fixed the fault lines between Russia and the West that set in motion the conflicts that would dominate the century to come.”
The primary cause of this war was the great powers’ rivalries in the Middle East. Britain, a hegemonic power at the time, feared that Russia could control the Eastern Mediterranean and create an Eastern Empire challenging British supremacy in India. The Crimean War, lasting three years and costing much in blood and treasure, is often considered by military historians as one of the most futile wars ever fought. The same can be said about the conflict in Ukraine.
The Modern Conflict
Russia is depicted as an expansionist power threatening international equilibrium. Any extension of Russian influence in the Middle East was seen by the Allies as a threat to European balance of power and general peace. The British sought to demonstrate that a parliamentary government with a free press could triumph over authoritarianism. The media portrayed Russia as a despotic, anti-parliamentarian regime, economically backward, in contrast to the democratic and civilized France and Britain.
Entering the 21st century, President Biden’s commitment to liberal ideals places the ongoing struggle between democracy and autocracy at the forefront. This ideological and moral battlefield risks plunging into the Thucydides trap, potentially leading to a suicidal war with China and Russia. Biden’s portrayal of Russia as an expansionist power mirrors the perspective of 1854 when allied powers aimed to prove democracy’s superiority over authoritarianism.
The main cause of the conflict in Ukraine remains the great powers’ rivalries simmering since the Cold War’s end, manifesting in a struggle for global hegemony, leading to a series of interconnected events since the 1990s.
Warnings Ignored
In 1998, George F. Kennan, the eminent American diplomat, cautioned against NATO expansion, foreseeing it as a pivotal error of American policy in the post-Cold War era. Kennan predicted that Russian reactions would gradually turn adverse, influencing their policies. He concluded that a separate and independent Ukraine could only be sustained through force.
Henry Kissinger has remarked, “Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must be neither an outpost against either side but should function as a bridge between them.”
While acknowledging the legitimacy of Russian security concerns articulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski and others, the roots of the Ukraine conflict are multifaceted. The conflict, often viewed as a legacy of the Bush administration, marked a shift in international relations. Bush’s “multilateralism à la carte,” with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, dismissed the concept of “spheres of interest” -the ability of other powers to demand deference from other states in their own sphere- in favour of American hegemony. This unilateral approach, embracing progressive liberalism and social engineering, led to reckless military involvements, including in Ukraine.
Russia’s Red Lines
President Vladimir Putin’s 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference was a harbinger, making Russia’s red lines and future policies clear. In January 2008, Ukraine formally requested to join the NATO “membership action plan,” choosing to be a bulwark against Russia rather than a bridge between Russia and the West, further fuelling tensions.
George W. Bush’s advocacy for extending the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine and Georgia at the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit was counterproductive, though Germany and France rejected it. Nevertheless, the compromise and the promise that Ukraine would one day be a member of NATO ignored Russia’s core strategic interests and its sphere of influence, leading to the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia.
Ukraine as a Geopolitical Pawn
Ukraine became a pawn on the geopolitical chessboard, envisioned as a critical core of European security and for expanding American influence in the Eurasian Balkans, part of the greater power competition between the U.S. and China. This decision intensified the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, leading to a proxy war with global implications. The decade-long conflict since 2014 remains complex but was neither irrational nor unforeseeable. The war began when Russian forces took control of Crimea in February 2014, leading to its annexation.
The Current Conflict
The conflict saw lapses in intensity, partly due to the Minsk agreements of 2014 and 2015, but the full-scale war launched on February 24, 2022, marked by atrocities and genocidal intent, constitutes a blatant violation of international law. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhian regions undermines sovereignty and challenges the international rules-based order.
Victory in this conflict is elusive. Russia enjoys “escalation dominance” in Ukraine, confirmed by the ratio of people and artillery between the two sides. Initial optimism for a swift Ukrainian victory by 2022, as expressed by members of the Ukrainian military leadership has not aligned with the harsh reality. It is becoming clear that Ukraine cannot regain control over its former territories, and this proxy war against Russia was not supposed to end this way.
The Need for Diplomacy
With President Biden suggesting “regime change” in Russia and the Defence Secretary desiring a “total defeat” of Russia, the West’s commitment to Ukraine appears indefinite, with the EU stating, “for as long as it takes,” or Biden saying, “as long as we can.” However, continued EU support is uncertain, especially with U.S. elections on the horizon. This conflict is not seen as an existential threat to the US or Europe. An American ambassador noted, “We told Israel that we’d defend it, we never said that to Ukraine.”
These are the fruits of delusion and hubris; what follows is nemesis if we cannot find a diplomatic solution. General Valery Zaluzhny, head of the Ukrainian army, confirmed last November that this war of attrition is at a stalemate, foreseeing extended trench warfare. He echoed General Milley’s assessment that the war is unwinnable by purely military means.
Conclusion
The harsh realities of the conflict in Ukraine resemble Vietnam: a war fought by the poor. Ukrainian forces are exhausted, outgunned, and outnumbered, with several hundred thousand Ukrainian men fleeing rather than fighting. Winning seems highly improbable, yet Ukraine demands a return to the 1991 borders, as articulated in President Zelensky’s 10-point ‘peace formula,’ emphasizing justice and retribution for Ukraine, is an unrealistic stance given the complexities.
President Zelensky’s demands and criticisms of the Allies aim to drag the West and NATO deeper into the war, widening and escalating the conflict, hoping for direct Allied intervention, as the only way to win.
The growing difficulties encountered by Ukrainian forces in resisting Russian militaries has set a new stage by lifting the veto on the use of Western weapons, and the forthcoming dispatch of instructors to Ukraine. French President Emmanuel Macron’s involvement by training Ukrainian soldiers and sending fighter jets escalates the conflict further. The spark that ignited the First World War looms, threatening Europe once again.
In the West, the narrative of winning never-ending wars persists, a narrative about losing credibility if not victorious—narratives heard before about Korea, Vietnam, during the U.S. support for “freedom fighters” in Afghanistan, and about Iraq, thereby ignoring the realities and costs.
The Biden administration’s approach mirrors the proxy war in Afghanistan, a dangerous gambit. We in the West follow a strategy of illusions and risk sleepwalking into a direct war between Russia and NATO, where the use of tactical nuclear weapons is no longer inconceivable, at a time both sides have convinced themselves the other side is bluffing.
The pressing questions remain: What core interests are at stake for the US and its Allies in Ukraine? Why risk escalation leading to WWIII over Donbas and Crimea? Why should NATO get involved in Ukraine or respond militarily to wars fought at its periphery?
NATO has been rightly careful to balance its defensive mission and defence culture, avoid escalation, and should go no further. NATO does not have a strategic concept based on “forward defence” and NATO’s role should remain balanced and defensive, avoiding further escalation. This must be the case in Ukraine or in the South China Sea.
Reflecting on the human and economic costs of this conflict, it is time to consider the Kissinger-era paradigms of “spheres of influence” and “balance of power,” that hold the key to solving these issues. Negotiations become unavoidable, as history shows wars end through agreements based on battlefield realities. Without this, the destruction of Ukraine may persist, making it unliveable.
Unquestionably, finding a solution is challenging. But must we conclude that no negotiation is possible with Vladimir Putin, who sees himself as the saviour of a “holy Russia” and threatened by the vices of the liberal order? History is tragic; we are condemned to restrain our hubris or risk destruction.
Netherlands, WJJH – June 2024
📌 Blog Excerpt
Diatribe: In the Greek myth and tragedy, hubris represents the pretension to be godlike, disregarding the divine balance among God, man, and nature. Historical parallels between conflicts in Crimea are drawn, leading to the current conflict in Ukraine. There is a call for diplomatic solutions and a caution against overconfidence and escalation. The realities of the conflict in Ukraine make winning highly improbable, with dire consequences if diplomatic solutions cannot be found.
I don’t see that you built a. case for your statement that there no negotiation with Putin is possible.
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that no negotiation with . . .
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Sorry, I misread read it and missed the question mark.
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Much appreciated for the comments. As a side remark, contrary to the popular belief in some circles the house of civilization is not a western house but is consisting of different houses and democracy at the point of a gun never worked! Bring democracy to Russia and China is like thinking they are characters in Bernard Shaw “Pygmalion” ready to be transformed to stakeholders in US dominated international order. The US lacks the ability and instruments to transform Russia and China, and should not even try this.
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