A Transition Without Illusion

A Transition Without Illusion

Power, Law, and the End of Western Certainty

✍️Author’s Note
This essay reflects a line of thought I have held since the early post–Cold War years, shaped by readings of The End of History and the Last Man and later by the strategic realism of Brzezinski and Kissinger. It is not a reaction to recent political personalities, but an attempt to place current developments within a longer historical and geopolitical context. The piece is written in the belief that Europe’s challenges today are less about sudden rupture than about delayed recognition of structural change.

The international order is not collapsing in a dramatic rupture; it is undergoing a gradual and uneven transition. What is changing is not the existence of institutions, treaties, or legal frameworks, but their capacity to constrain power. The post-1945 system—shaped by multilateralism, legal restraint, and a shared belief in rules as a stabilising force—has increasingly given way to a more transactional environment, where outcomes are determined less by norms than by leverage.

This shift did not begin with any single administration or leader. It reflects deeper structural developments: the diffusion of power in a multipolar world, the limits of Western economic dominance, and the erosion of political consensus within liberal democracies themselves. Yet recent years have stripped away many remaining illusions. The United States, long regarded as both architect and guarantor of the international order, now approaches that order with growing selectivity. Commitments are reassessed, alliances recalibrated, and institutions treated less as shared constraints than as instruments of convenience.

This does not mark the end of American influence. Power remains considerable. What has changed is the willingness to subordinate that power to a stable and predictable framework of rules. The language of law and values continues to be employed, but it no longer reliably governs behaviour. Power politics, once moderated by institutional self-restraint, has reasserted itself more openly.

For Europe, this moment is particularly unsettling. The international environment in which European integration flourished was not merely a security arrangement, but a civilisational settlement—one in which power was increasingly mediated through law, and history appeared, if not finished, then at least contained. That assumption can no longer be sustained. The question is not whether rules still matter, but who is prepared to uphold them when they conflict with immediate advantage.

The result is a growing tension between form and substance. Institutions remain in place; norms are still invoked; treaties are still cited. Yet enforcement has become selective, and restraint uneven. This widening gap between declared principles and political practice has become one of the defining features of the present moment. It does not signal a return to outright anarchy, but it does mark the end of Western certainty—the belief that the order created in the aftermath of catastrophe would sustain itself through habit, legitimacy, and moral authority alone.

In this emerging landscape, power has not replaced law entirely, but it has reclaimed primacy. The challenge is no longer how to preserve the existing order intact, but how to navigate its transformation without illusion.

Closing — Europe at a Point of Adjustment

Europe has reached a stage where its long-standing assumptions require careful reconsideration. The transatlantic relationship endures, but the conditions under which it operates have changed.

The United States increasingly approaches international affairs through the lens of interest and leverage rather than custodianship of a shared order. This shift does not imply hostility toward Europe, but it does oblige Europe to reflect more soberly on how far its security, diplomacy, and global posture can continue to rest on inherited arrangements rather than deliberate choice.

The question Europe faces is therefore not how to restore the postwar order, but how to adapt to a world in which that order no longer frames political behaviour as reliably as it once did. One option is to preserve existing forms while accepting a gradual reduction in influence, relying on institutional continuity and normative language to obscure strategic dependency. Another is to lower ambitions and accept a more modest role in a multipolar environment, trading autonomy for stability. A third, more demanding path lies in cultivating selective autonomy: maintaining alliances while slowly strengthening Europe’s own capacity for decision, defence, and strategic coherence. None of these paths offers certainty, and none is without cost. History suggests, however, that adjustment undertaken deliberately is less disruptive than decline allowed to proceed unattended.

Epilogue — Three Perspectives on Order

The emerging international landscape is shaped by differing conceptions of power, law, and responsibility, most clearly visible in Washington, Brussels, and Beijing.

In Washington, power has become more openly instrumental. Institutions and alliances remain important, but increasingly as tools rather than constraints. The emphasis lies on flexibility, speed, and advantage, reflecting a political culture less inclined to view order as a shared project than as a negotiable outcome. This approach retains effectiveness, though it places strain on the norms that once amplified American influence.

In Brussels, continuity predominates. The language of law, multilateralism, and values remains central, even as the capacity to enforce them evolves more slowly. Europe’s strength lies in regulation, compromise, and institutional memory; its vulnerability in hesitation where strategic clarity is required. The distance between aspiration and capability has become more visible—not because Europe lacks principles, but because it remains cautious about power.

In Beijing, order is understood differently. Authority, hierarchy, and stability take precedence over procedural legitimacy. Law serves state purpose rather than limiting it, and sovereignty is treated as indivisible. China does not seek to universalise its model, but it acts with internal consistency, lending its conduct a certain predictability even when it diverges sharply from Western expectations.

These perspectives coexist without convergence. Each reflects its own history, priorities, and constraints. Europe’s particular challenge lies not in choosing between them, but in recognising that its long-held assumption—that power could largely be delegated while norms carried the weight—belongs to an earlier phase of history.

The task ahead is therefore modest in ambition but demanding in execution: to align Europe’s language more closely with its capacities, to accept limits without resignation, and to adapt thoughtfully to a world in which order is less inherited than negotiated.

William J J Houtzager, Aka WJJH, January, 2026

📌Blog Excerpt

The international order is not collapsing; it is quietly changing character.
As power reasserts primacy over law, Europe faces a choice between dependency, managed decline, or strategic maturity. This essay reflects on how long-ignored realities are now surfacing—and why adaptation matters more than illusion.